Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. The cornerstone of the USAF's global strike and rapid global mobility is its vast cyber-based C4ISR network. The USAF has become so dependent on cyber-based C4ISR capabilities that the network itself has truly become a center of gravity. Unfortunately, the network's critical requirements are highly susceptible to attack from a number of threats. As a result, one of the USAF's greatest capabilities has also become one of its greatest vulnerabilities. Using open-source documentation, this paper outlines the grave threat to the USAF's cyber-based C4ISR and suggests how the USAF should prepare its forces to operate in a cyber-denied environment. Current threats to the USAF's cyber-based C4ISR include traditional kinetic attack, cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, and anti-satellite weaponry; capabilities which potential adversaries have already operationalized. In light of these threats and the widespread availability and vulnerability of targets, the USAF can in no way guarantee the availability of cyber-based C4ISR on the battlefield! To mitigate this risk, the USAF must: 1) convince Airmen the threats are credible, 2) update/create cyber-related contingency plans, 3) develop and implement an extensive USAF-wide training, exercise, and evaluation program, and 4) expand its existing aggressor program. Only then will the USAF have the potential to meet the nation's strategic military goals and defend its vital national interests across the full spectrum of operations. 
Introduction
In 2001, President George W. Bush vowed to build a -…force that is defined less by size and more by mobility and swiftness, one that is easier to deploy and sustain, one that relies more heavily on stealth, precision weaponry and information technologies. and a myriad of other contingencies across the globe.
As part of the DOD's transformation, the United States Air Force (USAF), downsized by approximately 35% starting in 1991 4 and realigned resources and personnel to transform into a smaller, more lethal and agile fighting force. 5 The cornerstone of this transformation, modern technology, compensated for the significant decrease in manpower and resources by increasing overall efficiency and effectiveness. One of the USAF's most important technological achievements is its highly-advanced and persistent Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) network. This network is also a crucial center of gravity for the present-day rapid global mobility and global attack options that the USAF brings to combatant commanders' full spectrum of joint operations. 6 Cyberspace (to include its associated infrastructure) is an absolutely critical requirement for the USAF's robust C4ISR capability. Unfortunately,
as noted by Secretary Gates in the 2008
National Defense Strategy, cyberspace's -unparalleled advantages‖ on the battlefield also present significant vulnerabilities. 7 Due to the dynamic environment, scope, and sheer magnitude of this rapidly evolving domain, the USAF can in no way guarantee the availability of cyber-based C4ISR on the battlefield. Potential adversaries, such as nation states, nongovernment organizations, hackers, and terrorists, have the potential to disrupt USAF cyberbased C4ISR, significantly degrading USAF rapid global mobility and global attack capabilities.
What can the Air Force do to address the above dilemma? In the long-term, a sound solution is to: 1) build (and continually update) a redundant and secure military cyberspace infrastructure with dynamic cyber-attack/defense capabilities and 2) develop, employ, and exercise more robust continuity of operations procedures to recover from successful enemy attacks on cyber-based C4ISR. In the short-term, if the USAF continues to rely on cyber-based C4ISR as one of its -unparalleled‖ advantages, it must: 1) come to grips with the inherent insecurity of cyberspace and 2) take steps to mitigate the risks associated with the growing number of potential adversaries and their evolving ability to disrupt, deny, and/or degrade cyberdependent C4ISR. This paper analyzes why the USAF is at grave risk and suggests how the Air land, air, sea, and space-based systems (infrastructure, hardware, software) operated by civilian, DOD, U.S. Government, and international organizations. Highlights of this vast and complex network include land, sea, air and space-based military C4ISR weapon systems, personal computers, servers, mainframes, the Internet and its associated hardware/global infrastructure, non-Internet computer networks (e.g., LMR/TADL), and national and international power grids.
On the surface, these systems and their interaction are often opaque to most Airmen, but a detailed look reveals that the USAF has completely integrated cyber-based C4ISR into its full spectrum of operations. These systems support everything from command and control of combat forces (conventional and nuclear) to logistics (i.e., ordering, distributing, tracking of munitions, medical supplies, spare parts, etc.) and administration (i.e., military pay/medical records). Land, sea, air, and space-based C4ISR assets collect, store, and transmit data for operations throughout the globe. Computer systems and networks, which at first glance may seem like a luxury, store critical data, supplement and/or automate countless operational and administrative functions, and enhance communications, increasing individual and organizational effectiveness and efficiency.
In short, the USAF can't operate without them! They are a key enabler for the USAF's recent reorganization, laying the foundation for lean, efficient, and streamlined processes centered on modern technology. As for the Internet, even though Airmen may not need access to -Yahoo‖ or -CNN‖ to accomplish their mission, they rely on the Internet-based Non-secure Internet Protocol
Router Network (NIPRNET)/Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) 9 and their associated backbone (e.g., undersea cables, satellite links, etc.) to access and transfer vital C4ISR data on a daily basis. Finally, military and civilian power grids fuel the extensive energy needs of cyber-based C4ISR's infrastructure.
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Unfortunately, several fundamental problems make it virtually impossible for the USAF to completely defend the cyber-based C4ISR critical requirements outlined above. Preventing successful attacks altogether, on the other hand, is not only cost-prohibitive, but also technologically unfeasible. As a result, the aforementioned cyber-based C4ISR critical requirements are also exposed critical vulnerabilities. Regrettably, many of the people who seem to understand this concept also happen to be potential adversaries.
Threats to Cyberspace Assets
To make matters worse, not only can adversaries exploit multiple cyber-based C4ISR vulnerabilities, they have several distinct capabilities to choose from when making an attack.
Principal offensive capabilities include, but are not limited to, cyberspace operations, electronic warfare (EW), traditional kinetic attack, and more advanced, but evolving, anti-satellite weapons (ASAT). The brief summary of capabilities that follows is not intended to discuss threats in detail, nor to imply whether or not the United States has similar capabilities, but rather to outline the inherent vulnerability of the USAF's cyber-based C4ISR.
Cyberspace operations, which JP 1-02 defines in part as, -the employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or through The bottom line: USAF cyber-based C4ISR is dependent upon a vast network of assets that includes land, sea, air, and space-based components. The complexity and interdependency of this network, coupled with a growing number of threats, creates too many avenues of attack to mount an impenetrable defense. Consequently, adversaries may be able to disrupt, deny, and/or degrade critical cyber-based C4ISR capabilities, if only for a short, albeit crucial, time, affecting the USAF's ability to meet strategic military goals and/or defend vital national interests.
Potential Adversaries
A discussion on potential threats is merely an academic exercise without matching vulnerabilities and threats with adversaries that have both the capabilities and the will to use them. Currently, the most notable threats are China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran (note: since traditional kinetic attack is commonplace, this section will not cover enemy capabilities in this category). See Appendix A, Capabilities of Potential Adversaries, for more detailed information on China and Russia.
China

According to the Department of Defense's Annual Report to Congress on the Military
Power of the People"s Republic of China 2008, China is -pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fighting and winning short duration, high intensity conflicts along its periphery against high-tech adversaries -an approach that China refers to as preparing for ‗local wars under conditions of informatization.'‖ 24 Although this transformation initially appears to be aimed at a potential conflict over Taiwan, Department of Defense officials suggest China is planning for the future as well, essentially preparing its military for future conflicts over resources and/or territories. 25 Fully aware that it currently can't compete symmetrically against U.S. military forces, the cornerstone of China's new strategy is increasingly focusing on antiaccess strategies with a large emphasis on space and cyberspace. 26 China's buildup of cyber forces/capabilities, procurement of EW systems, and successful development of ASAT weaponry, mark China as one of the greatest threats to the USAF's cyber-based C4ISR.
China's cyber attack capabilities are mature, backed by cyberwarfare doctrine, a cyberwarfare training program for officers, and integrated cyberwarfare field training.
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Suspected cyber capabilities include, but are not limited to: large, advanced BotNets, nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse weapons, a zero-day exploitation framework, compromised counterfeit computer hardware, peripheral devices, microprocessors, and software, advanced dynamic exploitation options, wireless communication jammers, computer logic bombs, viruses and worms, and cyber data collection tools. 28 As for EW, China could use its existing nuclear munitions to create EMPs and has operational ground-based EW satellite jammers to degrade U.S. communications satellites. 29 With regards to space, China demonstrated an operational capability to attack low-Earth orbit satellites in 2007. 30 Whether or not they are pursuing, or already have, the capability to intercept satellites at higher orbits with kinetic ASATs is unclear.
Finally, as noted by the Department of Defense, the Chinese are aggressively pursuing directedenergy weapons (e.g., lasers). 31 If perfected, the Chinese could combine these two technologies to mount a grave threat to a variety of U.S. satellites.
Bottom Line: China already possesses the doctrine and proven kinetic (traditional military), cyber, EW, and ASAT systems to infiltrate and/or attack U.S. cyber-based C4ISR assets. Additionally, given its tendency to supply military aid to other nations, China will likely
export some, or all, of these technologies to other potential adversaries.
Russia
Despite the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia remains a highly-capable military power that has recently showed renewed signs of life. 
The Greatest Cyberspace Threat to the USAF…Itself
Potential adversaries, such as China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, recognize cyberbased C4ISR as a center of gravity…they recognize cyberspace as a critical vulnerability…if necessary, they will exploit this vulnerability…and if the USAF isn't fully prepared, the consequences could be disastrous. Based on potential threats and the futility of an allencompassing defense, the USAF must be prepared to operate in a cyber-denied environment.
Ironically, the greatest obstacle to avoiding disaster is the USAF, which has not sufficiently addressed the threat to cyber-based C4ISR. To break the overconfidence in cyber-based C4ISR, the USAF must change its culture and acknowledge the gravity of the situation.
The first step in managing this culture change is to identify the root of the problem. Has the USAF's senior leadership, who began their careers before the explosion of cyber-based C4ISR, not grasped the reliance on, overconfidence in, threat to, and vulnerabilities of cyber- briefing all personnel to their appropriate security clearances, the USAF has kept the developments in cyberspace a quiet secret. Even if it chose to brief personnel on current threats and operations, the USAF has classified much of the key information so high that it wouldn't make it down to the majority of Airmen in the first place. The closest thing to a comprehensive mass training and education program that outlines threats and vulnerabilities is the current IA training program, which only shallowly discusses hostile cyberspace operations (but not EW, kinetic attack, or ASATs). Sadly, to underscore the inadequacy of this program, many Airmen complete this basic computer-based course, which only covers very rudimentary concepts, in less than 20 minutes. It does not cover the threats, vulnerabilities, and resulting operational deficiencies in near enough detail…and it is completely unclassified. While it is understandable that the USAF must maintain a measure of security to protect collection sources, intelligence capabilities, and organic cyber defense capabilities, it simply can't afford to keep the majority of Airmen, who are -on‖ the ‗battlefield,' in the dark. Every Airman that logs on to a computer, works on a C4ISR weapon platform, or is stationed at a base that has, supports, or uses cyberbased C4ISR infrastructure is already "on" the "battlefield" and clearly has the need to know! So, even though cyber-based C4ISR is such an integral part of USAF operations, it is easy to see why many Airmen simply don't believe potential adversaries can disrupt, deny, and/or degrade cyber-based C4ISR capabilities; there currently isn't a consolidated effort to convince them otherwise. Yet, since every Airman is a combatant in the cyberspace domain, the USAF must make a universal and concerted effort to reverse this disturbing trend. Would
Airmen be ready to fight through a chemical or biological attack today if they didn't believe the threat was real? Would they take their training and precautionary measures seriously? Probably not. Would the Airmen manning the nation's strategic missile silos during the Cold War have been as disciplined, well-prepared, and motivated if they had never believed in the Soviet threat?
Not likely. Airmen must understand and believe in the threat to maximize current defense postures in the event enemy forces compromise cyber-based C4ISR.
The Way Ahead
Thus far, this paper has outlined a grim situation. The USAF has become dependent on a center of gravity that is extremely difficult to defend; potential adversaries have identified this weakness and are preparing to exploit it; and, worst of all, many of the Airmen who depend on cyber-based C4ISR are largely unaware of and unprepared for the growing threats. Fortunately, it is not too late to address this alarming trend. If the USAF acts quickly and aggressively, it can effectively prepare its forces to operate in a cyber-denied environment. To do this, the USAF must: 1) convince Airmen the threat is real, 2) posture the USAF to deal with attacks by updating/creating installation, Geographic Combatant Command (GCC), Functional Combatant Command (FCC), and Major Command (MAJCOM) cyber-related contingency plans, 3) develop and implement an extensive USAF-wide education, training, exercise, and evaluation program, and 4) expand its existing cyberspace aggressor program.
Step 1: An Information Campaign
Luckily, convincing Airmen that the threat to cyber-based C4ISR may be easier than it sounds. First and foremost, the USAF must bring Airmen up to speed on the entire situation commensurate with their security clearances…and it must do this immediately. As cyber-based C4ISR users and/or operators, every Airman is not only a link in the USAF's defensive armor, but a potential chink as well; as such, all Airmen have a -need to know.‖ Second, until incorporated into a formal education and training program, the USAF should implement mandatory recurring (recommend quarterly, minimum) situation briefings to keep the force focused and informed on developments in this dynamic domain. These briefings should focus on new capabilities, threats, and vulnerabilities while covering updates on documented cyber-based C4ISR attacks and methodology. Keeping the entire force appraised of developments will help foster a culture of vigilance, to include a renewed emphasis on OPSEC, rather than a culture of blind trust. Finally, USAF leadership should reevaluate the classifications of known threats, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and ongoing attacks to balance the need for secrecy with Airmen's need to understand the situation. In the end, this should help Airmen develop the right frame of reference and state-of-mind to recognize and break the overconfidence in cyber-based C4ISR.
Step 2: Update/Create Installation, GCC/FCC/MAJCOM Cyber-Related Contingency
Plans
Once the USAF brings Airmen up to speed on the current situation, the next step is to focus on basic contingency planning requirements. Consequently, the USAF should take this opportunity to perform a thorough assessment of not only Information Systems contingency plans (critical and non-critical), but all USAF-wide contingency plans related to cyber-based C4ISR capabilities. The purposes of this assessment should be to: 1) ensure compliance with DOD and USAF regulatory guidance, 2) review existing contingency plans and identify/correct shortfalls, and 3) build required contingency plans not yet on file. This will help bolster the USAF's ability to meet the NMS-CO mandated -ability to operate through degradation‖ by taking into account -resilience, redundancy, restorative capacity, consequence management, [and] continuity of operations (COOP)…‖ 56 in cyberspace.
Step specific skill sets and specialties. Moreover, the USAF often limits simulated attacks on cyberbased C4ISR during many of these exercises to prevent interference with ‗more pressing' objectives. 57 At best, current programs prepare cyber-based C4ISR defenders and infrastructure operators with the skills, training, and experience necessary to recognize and recover from enemy attacks, but they do not prepare the majority of everyday Airmen (cyber-based C4ISR users) for operations in a contested cyberspace environment.
To put the general education, training, exercise, and evaluation deficiency into perspective, compare the IA training program with the biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological attack (collectively referred to as weapons of mass destruction-WMD 58 ) readiness.
Despite relatively widespread availability, not a single nation has ever used WMD against the United States; the U.S. response and international consequences for such an attack would most likely be severe. Yet, the mere fact that potential adversaries have the capability to field WMD has prompted the USAF to establish the Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program, which ensures all Airmen can -prepare for, prevent, respond to, [and] recover from‖ chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive attacks. 59 As a part of this program, every USAF unit must -develop plans, training, contingency response checklists and exercises based upon a realistic threat and assessment of resources that will be available in a contingency.‖ 60 The majority of Airmen must complete both web-based training and local classroom and demonstration training, while installations plan and execute multiple recurring, realistic exercises that -embody the ‗train the way we fight' concept‖ and -validate actual plans, policies, procedures, processes, and doctrine.‖procedures during Operational Readiness Inspections, grading the -ability to survive and operate (ATSO)‖ for installations with wartime or contingency missions. 62 Thus, in stark contrast to the narrow audience that train for attacks against cyber-based C4ISR, the USAF has gone through great lengths to educate, train, and prepare Airmen for a WMD attack that hasn't materialized in over half a century.
The most timely, efficient, and effective way to correct this deficiency is to integrate cyber-based C4ISR attack into the USAF EM Program. The EM Program already provides: 1)
-…higher headquarters, installations, and unit commanders with the policies, guidance, structure, and roles and responsibilities to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate threats to their mission‖ and 2) the -guidance to plan, conduct, and evaluate Air Force The basic cyberspace orientation would be a one-time course that introduces cyberspace and its associated C4ISR capabilities to all new Airmen (commensurate with security clearances). Ideally, Airmen should attend this course shortly after basic training (i.e., tech schools, pilot training) since cyber-based C4ISR will be part of their lives from the start. At a minimum, course content should include those items listed in Appendix B.
Unlike the generic orientation course, the cyberspace defense awareness should cover more specific and tailored education and training based on an installation's/organization's mission (commensurate with security clearances). Airmen should initially take this course upon arrival at a permanent duty station (for PCSs) or a TDY location (AEF deployments), then recurrently based on Appendix B. Course content should include items in Appendix B.
Proposed additions to the EM program should also include multiple installation and GCC/FCC/MAJCOM-wide exercises that simulate realistic attacks to cyber-based C4ISR (100% organization participation). This will give installations, GCCs/FCCs/MAJCOMs, and the IG (ORIs) the opportunity to test and evaluate cyber-based C4ISR vulnerabilities, contingency plans, readiness, etc. Appendix B outlines proposed exercise scenarios, participants, content, and frequencies. And yes, exercise frequencies may seem aggressive, but the threat to cyber-based C4ISR is too great to accommodate mere convenience. However, to mitigate this inconvenience, installations and GCCs/FCCs/MAJCOMs could align these exercises with HHQ exercises and/or other operational exercises to reduce the drain on available time and resources. The USAF would also need to provide additional IG manpower, expertise, and funding for ORIs. In light of decreasing budgets this may be daunting, but the USAF must make a serious investment in this process to guarantee its ability to meet strategic military goals and defend vital national interests.
Step 4: Expand the Existing Aggressor Program
Last, but certainly not least, the USAF needs to bolster its existing cyber aggressor program. Currently, Airmen from the 57th and 177th (ANG) Information Aggressor Squadrons infiltrate DOD networks world-wide to: 1) test cyber-defenses, attack recognition, and response and recovery actions/procedures, 2) identify shortfalls and gaps in defenses, and 3) assist friendly forces in developing new strategies and systems to prevent future attacks.
program, dubbed the Information Operations Road Show, is to train Airmen to recognize and recover from attacks by simulating operations against friendly forces using known threats. 65 To kick off an -attack,‖ the -Aggressors‖ spend months remotely and covertly infiltrating systems to gain a foothold in cyberspace at the targeted installation. 66 Next, the -Aggressors‖ send a team to the field, which exploits OPSEC deficiencies 67 to defeat the installation's layered defenses and gain -long-term, unhindered access‖ to key mission-related information. 68 Finally, the -Aggressors‖ replicate the simulated attack for the installation commander and staff, providing both positive and negative feedback that ultimately improves friendly defenses.
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This is a highly effective training program, but falls well short of simulating realistic, unexpected enemy attacks since the -Aggressors‖ typically do not disrupt, deny, and/or degrade cyber-based C4ISR capabilities that physically affect a base's mission or operations; but, not without reason. The -Aggressor‖ squadrons do not have the manning or funding to provide this additional dimension. 70 In addition, disrupting, denying, and/or degrading real-world C4ISR capabilities can create potentially unsafe situations. 71 Finally, current USAF culture is more comfortable with showing off strengths than revealing vulnerabilities; commanders are not necessarily enthusiastic about revealing a base's inability to defend vital assets. To make matters worse, time and geography, once one of the USAF's closest allies, mean little in cyberspace. There will likely be little or no warning for pending attacks against the USAF's cyber-based C4ISR assets. Preparation is: 1) covert in nature (i.e., sabotage), 2)
relatively quick (i.e., ASAT, jamming), or 3) a combination of the two (i.e., attacks through cyberspace…attacks based in cyberspace are especially dangerous; a cunning enemy will disguise preparation as mere espionage, and when the actual attack begins, it will occur at up to two-thirds the speed of light 73 ). Consequently, Airmen, who represent the first line of defense for cyber-based C4ISR, should get used to the fact that an attack can happen in an instant; they need to understand attacks will probably be widespread and have far reaching effects; and, they must be ready to operate indefinitely without the normal array of cyber-based C4ISR assets.
Providing Airmen with more realistic training is an optimal way to do this. Several current programs, such as Red Flag, Virtual Flag, and Blue Flag, already provide excellent cyberwarfare training, but the target audiences are not nearly large enough given the strategic situation. The Information Operations Road Show, on the other hand, has the potential to capture a much larger audience (in their natural work environment). To fully capitalize on the -Aggressor‖ program, the USAF should divert more resources (manpower and money) to these units. Funding may be scarce, but the USAF can't afford to lag behind in establishing continuity of operations for cyber-based C4ISR, which, as noted earlier, truly is a USAF center of gravity.
Second, -Aggressors‖ must have backing from the chain of command to simulate attacks against cyber-based C4ISR assets, even if they affect an installation's or organization's missions and associated operations…no matter how inconvenient.
Will this increase the risk for a safety incident? Yes, but the USAF has been doing this for years. For example, aircrew members have been simulating airborne emergencies and associated procedures for decades (e.g., simulated forced landings, engine failures, etc.).
However, the flying community has levied set rules of engagement (ROE) to mitigate the risk associated with this training. With well-planned ROE, the USAF could similarly mitigate the risk associated with more robust -Aggressor‖ attacks while providing Airmen realistic training. Highlighting organizational vulnerabilities would be important, but the greatest benefit from this type of training would an increase in operational readiness.. With adequate resources and a larger footprint, -Aggressor‖ attacks could make a significant positive impact on the most dynamic and flexible component of cyber-based C4ISR, the Airman. All Airmen, not just select specialties, would be better prepared to recognize and respond correctly to attacks on cyberbased C4ISR assets. Airmen would gain confidence in and familiarity with secondary/tertiary C4ISR systems and procedures rehearsed by this paper's proposed additions to the EM program.
Airmen would be better prepared to support national military objectives without losing valuable time adjusting to attacks against cyber-based C4ISR in short-duration high-intensity conflicts.
Conclusion
The above way ahead may seem daunting, but cyber-based C4ISR is an extremely vulnerable center of gravity for the USAF. As noted above, the network's critical requirements are highly susceptible to attack from a number of threats, which include traditional kinetic attack, cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, and anti-satellite weaponry. Potential adversaries are developing and/or already have developed capabilities to exploit these weaknesses, and due to the inherent insecurity and vulnerability of cyber-based C4ISR, the USAF can in no way guarantee the access of cyber-based C4ISR on the battlefield. To mitigate this extremely dangerous situation, the USAF must: 1) convince Airmen the threats are credible, 2) update/create contingency plans, 3) develop and implement an extensive USAF-wide training, exercise, and evaluation program, and 4) expand its existing aggressor program. Only then will the USAF have the potential to meet the nation's strategic military goals and defend its vital national interests across the full spectrum of operations.
capabilities? Or are they also testing U.S. counter-cyber-attack capabilities? Are they gathering and compiling sensitive information to gain an advantage in traditional combat operations? Or did they leave malicious software behind for later use? At a minimum, these intrusions indicate that military information located in cyberspace by no means secure. Worst case, the Chinese have already laid the groundwork to attack USAF cyber-based C4ISR through cyberspace at the time and place of their choosing.
Of course, China's cyber-based attacks are not the only threat to the United States' cyberbased C4ISR. On the contrary, China has been actively pursuing ASAT weaponry to counter the United States' space-based, cyber-based C4ISR infrastructure. 82 Current satellites do not incorporate robust defensive capabilities, making them highly-susceptible to electronic, kinetic, and/or directed-energy attack…all of which China is perfecting. 83 China's first foray into this arena occurred in the late 1990s when it purchased UHF-band jammers for communications satellites from Ukraine. 84 Since then, the Chinese have likely expanded this capability to include a wide-range of communications and GPS frequencies. 85 More recently, in January 2007, China demonstrated its newly-developed, yet limited, capability to attack low-Earth orbit satellites. 86 The Department of Defense has also noted that China is actively attempting to improve their ability to track and identify satellites. 87 If perfected, the Chinese could combine improved tracking with new ASAT systems to create a formidable offensive space capability.
Russia
As early as 1998, the Russians reportedly conducted a cyber-espionage campaign against the United States. 88 These intrusions lasted over two years and infiltrated technical defense research data in the Pentagon, NASA, the Energy Department, and multiple private laboratories. 89 With regards to ASAT systems, Russia inherited much of the U.S.S.R's Cold War-era space technology and systems. As a result, Russia has access to several proven ASAT systems and a legacy of research and development for others. 93 Between 1968 and 1982, the U.S.S.R.
conducted numerous successful tests of co-orbital ASAT systems effective up to 1600 kilometers in space, but eventually declared a moratorium on further development due to the Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative. 94 The U.S.S.R. also extensively researched ground-based laser ASAT systems starting in the 1970s 95 
